Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research
Volume 22

Issue 1

Article 7

April 2017

The Madisonian Standard for Conceptualizing American
Citizenship
Maddie E. Browning-Perry
mbrowni1@iwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Browning-Perry, Maddie E. (2017) "The Madisonian Standard for Conceptualizing
American Citizenship," Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 22
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol22/iss1/7
This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by editorial board of Res Publica and the Political Science
Department at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

The Madisonian Standard for Conceptualizing American Citizenship
Abstract
American political development was fashioned by a social contract. More specifically, the American
republic evolved through the Madisonian social contract, an agreement premised on James Madison’s
intention that deliberative citizenship would collaborate with decentralized government in order to
advance the public good. This paper identifies the problem with the Madisonian contract today, that the
relationship between citizens and government, or rather, Congress, is one that is infused with antagonism
and a record high level of distrust. This present-day characterization of the broken relationship between
citizens and Congress is symptomatic of a deteriorated Madisonian contract. Public opinion polls cast
the illusion that a broken Congress is responsible for the deterioration of Madison’s contract. However,
through an assessment of polling data along with an examination of the exceptional nature of citizenship
in America, this paper reasons that the dwindling of the Madisonian contract is due to a decline in thick
deliberative citizenship. In addition to diagnosing the current state of Madison’s contract, this paper
compares remedies to cure the problem of a thinly engaged citizenry in the hope to rewrite the terms of
the Madisonian contract within the contours of American political development.
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The Madisonian Standard for Conceptualizing American Citizenship
Maddie Browning-Perry
Abstract: American political development was fashioned by a social contract. More specifically,
the American republic evolved through the Madisonian social contract, an agreement premised
on James Madison’s intention that deliberative citizenship would collaborate with decentralized
government in order to advance the public good. This paper identifies the problem with the
Madisonian contract today, that the relationship between citizens and government, or rather,
Congress, is one that is infused with antagonism and a record high level of distrust. This presentday characterization of the broken relationship between citizens and Congress is symptomatic of
a deteriorated Madisonian contract. Public opinion polls cast the illusion that a broken
Congress is responsible for the deterioration of Madison’s contract. However, through an
assessment of polling data along with an examination of the exceptional nature of citizenship in
America, this paper reasons that the dwindling of the Madisonian contract is due to a decline in
thick deliberative citizenship. In addition to diagnosing the current state of Madison’s contract,
this paper compares remedies to cure the problem of a thinly engaged citizenry in the hope to
rewrite the terms of the Madisonian contract within the contours of American political
development.

The Madisonian Contract
The contemporary American state is exceptional in that its institutions of government and
the civic nature of its electorate developed through the apparatus of a social contract. The
Framers of the Constitution, and specifically James Madison, favored a decentralized state
structure that is premised on consent of the governed. This sentiment ultimately formed the
foundation of the Madisonian social contract in the American republic. Madison’s contract
demands that citizens and the government meet certain criteria of good form in order to fully and
legitimately engage in American political life. In 1806, John Stuart Mill established two broad
criteria of representative government that support Madisonian principles. First, it is reasoned that
officials should seek to improve the virtue and the intelligence of the people under their
jurisdiction. Second, Mill argues that officeholders should promote the deliberative qualities of
the people in order to advance the common good (Mill 226, 227). With regard to the good form
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exercised by citizens, Madison’s contract requires a strong civil society to fill the gaps in
America's decentralized government. As the Madisonian contract evolved with American
political development, Dahl (2006) reasons that republicanism began to grow into a larger
participatory system through the roots of the people. Holistically, the enlargement of the republic
to include more people would layer the deliberative selection of officeholders. Those who were
chosen as representatives were to be the wisest and most just members in society, furthermore, it
was assumed that their patriotism would be the least likely to sacrifice the public good. As the
Madisonian contract continued to evolve, deliberative grassroots participation became the key to
establishing a strong civil society that worked in accordance with officeholders to advance the
public good.

A Disruption in the Madisonian Contract- Today
Today the relationship between the American people and the government is exceptional
in that it is connected with disapproval of the way government handles its job and this is
exceptionally bad for the terms of Madison’s contract. Interestingly enough, Congress, the
branch that Madison (1787) would reason is the epitome of good republican principles, is viewed
as the broken branch by the American people according to Mann and Ornstein (2006). Even in
times when members of Congress collaborate effectively to create legislation and the legislature
does uphold its constitutional responsibilities, the public fails to recognize this effort. The
public’s displeasure with the overall congressional job according to Gallup public opinion
polling data has been persistently low since 1974, with an average approval rating of 33 percent.
Furthermore, in 2013 this displeasure of the congressional job was equally rampant across
political groups, with Republican approval at 9 percent, Independent approval at 8 percent, and
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Democrat approval at 10 percent (Newport 2013). The poll data exposes the contemporary
problem regarding civic duty in the political arena. That is, people do not seem to want to
participate in the arena, and if they do participate it is a result of distrusting the processes of
government. This deep-seated disapproval is corrosive to the terms of the Madisonian contract.
In order for the republic to operate as it should, the citizens and the government must maintain a
degree of trust to uphold the criteria of good form in order to work together.
Many scholars have explored the source of disruption in Madison's contract, and posit the
traditional assumption that Congress has degenerated. Magleby and Patterson (1994) argue that
people have a deep-seated aversion to the legislative process. Furthermore, they reason that one
component of the public’s generally negative impression of Congress involves perceived
corruption within the institution. Similarly, Mann and Ornstein (2006) argue that much of the
“damage” within Congress is due to “the social and political environment rooted in partisanship”
caused by external factors that exacerbate internal inefficiencies within the chamber itself
(Mann, Ornstein, 224). Another argument posed by John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse
(1995) reasons that negativity is generated by popular perceptions with regard to the visible
process of the legislature (Hibbing, Morse, 150). In other words, they reason that Congress has
developed internal inefficiencies that are visible to people, and recognizing these inefficiencies is
the source of rightful disapproval of the legislature.
Since its founding, the actual institution of Congress has not undergone large structural
changes that would hinder its job or its purpose. Congress is responsible for creating legislation
that advances the public good, which it can only accomplish through the legislative process. The
legislative job has always maintained the slow, sometimes frustrating, deliberative qualities
demanded by republicanism. Furthermore, this process has always been visible to the American
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people. In fact, these qualities of deliberation and transparency are a source of republican
legitimacy. It is a direct contradiction that people claim the congressional job lacks legitimacy,
yet they fail to recognize the legitimate qualities of the legislature, established by the Madisonian
contract that are right in front of them. It is reasoned in this paper that Congress, or rather
government, is not the body responsible for the corrosion of the Madisonian contract.
James Stimson (2004) has studied the long-term trends in public opinion. He reasons that
“like waves, public opinion moves up and down… these movements also occur with larger
movements, the tides” (Stimson, 3). Stimson equates the tide-like behavior to public opinion and
furthermore he reasons that this behavior is influenced by national events such as the September
11th terror attacks, scandal in government, and economic factors. In his analysis of several
governors’ approval ratings through time, he finds that every governor enjoyed a higher approval
rating post-September 11th. He conducted this same analysis, but instead examined positive
economic times and political scandals. Through each study, Stimson found that public opinion is
extremely subjective. In fact, it was found that people responded to their own endogenous
perception of an event as well as the external event itself. Furthermore, his study indicated that
even in times when external factors were held constant, public opinion fluctuated tremendously
and has become somewhat untamed. The untamed behavior of subjective public opinion is an
indication that people lack the capacity to objectively judge political situations and events. If this
is the case, then it is entirely plausible that citizens are incapable of objectively judging the way
the government handles its job and thus, it stands to be reasoned that it is American citizens who
are responsible for the disruption in the Madsonian contract.
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The Exceptional Nature of American Citizenship Supposed by Madison
In order for republicanism to work properly, both sides of the Madisonian contract must
be upheld. Specifically, citizens must display active participation paired with reason, which are
two components of thick citizenship required by the Madisonian contract. With regard to action,
citizens are bound to practice legal obedience and should strive to be active participants
entrenched in political affairs. With regard to reason, citizens should achieve an advanced level
of political education, which will enable them to develop the capacity to form good judgments
and allow them to be competent participants in political life. Thick citizenship was intended by
Madison to be deliberative in nature and to be at the very heart of the American republic.
In the past, the American citizenry successfully filled the gaps inherent in decentralized
government through membership in voluntary associations. As Theda Skocpol (2003) points out,
American political life became thick with civil society groups from the 1820s to the 1960s,
which were “bound by strong families and tight knit neighborhoods” (Skocpol, 21). Furthermore,
these human-scale associations allowed Americans to achieve a sense of belonging and civic
responsibility. By 1840, Madison’s republican model included the community groups and
organizations that characterize thick citizenship. The mid-nineteenth through the mid-twentieth
century marked the height of voluntarism in the American republic. Citizens were members of
independent women’s associations, fraternal societies, and trade associations. There were many
social opportunities available to members of these voluntary associations, but more importantly
“their roles as organized voices for citizens, their political activities” as Skocpol reasons, formed
the backbone of strong civil society (Skocpol, 70). Many of these voluntary associations
“pressed for public social programs” and advocated for local, state, and national public social
policies to benefit their members. In fact, voluntary membership associations helped to lead
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national efforts and motivated social welfare programs from the Civil War era through WWII
(Skocpol, 71).
The importance of voluntary membership associations in American political development
is monumental because voluntary associations acted as mediums to promote civic deliberation.
Voluntary groups extended membership inclusion to outsiders, similarly to the way Madison
expanded the republic to become a larger participatory system. Prior to inclusion in one of these
voluntary associations, people participate in social and political life very thinly. David Ricci
(2004) reasons that this status characterizes Citizenship I, the thinnest, most basic type of
citizenship. Citizenship I recognizes that individuals are merely members of American society.
At the height of voluntarism, thousands of people became members of these voluntary groups,
which acted as civic incubators to develop people into citizens. As Ricci (2004) reasons,
Citizenship II, qualifies citizens as members in society and also tasks them with the duty to
participate in political affairs by way of voting, running for office, etc. An even thicker type of
citizenship, Citizenship III, encompasses membership, political participation, and virtuous action
on the part of the citizen to defend the public good (Ricci, 25). Voluntary associations developed
a person’s capacity to reason, motivated membership action, and presented members with the
opportunity to exercise these two tools, which in turn developed people into thick citizens of the
Citizenship II and Citizenship III variety.

The Fork in the Road
Volunteer associations were informational mediums that facilitated the exchange of ideas
through deliberation, an activity that promoted the development of other civic requisites and
grounded individual opinion. Through the variety of associational mediums, people accessed an
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abundance of information gleaned from members and resources of the group. Furthermore, these
mediums afforded people a public space to exercise their thick citizenship and develop
participation into virtuous action. In other words, people practiced the rights of Citizenship II to
secure the goals of Citizenship III. Citizens lived well through the habitual practice and
procurement of reason and good civic virtue. Living well then prompted citizens to direct
individual reason and civic virtue to advance the public good.
According to Ricci (2004), the latter half of the post WWII era marked a time of
increased economic productivity in the United States. Productivity “justified the wage hikes and
made it possible for workers to have steady incomes working fewer hours as time passed” (Ricci,
165). As a direct result, the rise of consumerism changed the material standard of American life,
as it changed the priorities that constituted public life (Ricci, 65). Americans began to pursue
materialistic affluence as an acceptable form of living well. People, officeholders, and
businessmen alike were persuaded to submit to new requirements of public life. These newly
established habits replaced many old living habits that constituted thick citizenry engagement
and shifted people away from active political participation to more capitalistic activities. This
shift in the routine of public life led to the fall of many volunteer associations, which afforded
people the civic requisites of thick citizenship.
As Robert Putnam in Bowling Alone reasons, the social bonds that united American
public life have been broken, “the frequent interaction among a diverse group of informed
citizens which produced the norm of reciprocity” between citizens and the government is now
absent (Putnam 2000). The thick citizenry that once existed in towns, neighborhoods, and
bowling teams alike has devolved into Citizenry I, a group that participates thinly in American
political life. People of Citizenry I are content to bowl alone and feel no civic responsibility to
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Madison’s republic, or to their fellow American. Members of America’s thin citizenry prefer to
be less involved in civic affairs, in favor of a republic that operates on autopilot, where people
only occasionally participate. The mediums that once grounded civic duty and informed opinion
are now absent, which means that the trusted arena to practice political cognizance is now
absent. Given the absence of a reliable medium and the shifting obligations of citizens in society,
the Madisonian contract has been forced to operate through the vestiges of thin citizenship.

T. H Marshall: Revitalizing America’s Thin Citizenry
The fundamental component of strong civil society that characterized American
exceptionalism has dwindled. How will the contemporary American republic restore the thick
citizenry that it has lost? Any type of restoration effort performed should follow the contours of
American political development. The American republic is one model of citizenship that is built
on the foundation of strong civil society, while simultaneously it works to defeat majority
tyranny. There are other models of strong citizenship that can be examined in order to inform a
possible solution for the American republic. The European model of good citizenship that is built
on the foundation of defeating class conflict could potentially offer a compelling solution.
T.H Marshall (1992) explored the roots of citizenship in Western Europe and found that,
unsurprisingly, good citizenship is established through holistic membership in society.
Analogous to Ricci’s three types of citizenship in the American republic, Marshall equates
citizenship in Western Europe to three distinct categories, the civil, political, and social
apparatuses of membership. Western European political development through the eighteenth,
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries marked the independent development of each of these three
elements of citizenship. Each time period established, not merely which citizenship rights were
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recognized by society in principle, but to what extent the rights recognized in principle could
also be enjoyed by citizens in practice.
In early Western European society, Marshall argues that feudalism structured the norms
and habits of people based on class status, this order “then hardened into a European custom”
(Marshall, 20). All people did not possess the rights of citizenship through membership. Rather,
rights were designated to different social classes in society and a citizen’s class status determined
which type of rights that citizen could enjoy. There is implicit inequality of membership in each
class and therefore people could not be good citizens until they achieved membership in the
middle to high-class status.
In the eighteenth century, Marshall designates European citizenship to encompass the
civil element. Civil citizenship developed and it was “composed of the rights necessary for
individual freedom-liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own
property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice” (Marshall, 8). At the end of the
eighteenth century it was recognized that citizens had the right to due process of the law and the
institutions of government most associated with this civil element are the courts of justice. In the
nineteenth century, the political element of European citizenship developed. Marshall reasons
that the political element is “the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a
member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a
body” (Marshall, 8). By the end of the nineteenth century, people had the right to vote and to
exercise political power. The government institutions most associated with the political element
are the parliament and the councils of local government. The social element of citizenship was
not included in European citizenship until the twentieth century. By the social element Marshall
means, “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the
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right to share to the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the
standards prevailing in society” (Marshall, 8). The institutions most associated with the social
right are connected to the education system and the social services system.
When Marshall assigned the formative periods of the three elements of citizenship, each
to a separate century-civil rights to the eighteenth, political to the nineteenth and social to the
twentieth-he did so while stipulating that in Europe there was no uniform collection of rights and
duties which all “men--noble and common, free and serf--were endowed by virtue of their
membership in society” (Marshall, 8). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, people may
have possessed civil and political rights, but those rights were curtailed “by class prejudice and
lack of opportunity” (Marshall, 27). It wasn’t until a social revolution occurred in the twentieth
century that the “monopoly of the social rights of the few were brought progressively within the
reach of the many,” which made class mobility possible and presented people with the tools to
exercise their civic and political citizenship rights (Marshall, 27). The European social revolution
incorporated social rights into citizenship status and from this incorporation the universal social
right to equal employment opportunity, compulsory education, adequate housing, and various
welfare programs became part of the European societal fabric. In the European model of
citizenship, social programs are the prerequisites to thick citizenship, as this model is built on
class interest and overcoming the inequality that it presents. Once citizens’ social needs were
taken care of they could better focus time and energy into being active members in political life.
Western European citizenship was hindered by the lack of social rights afforded to
citizens until the twentieth century. In the American republic today, citizenship is hindered by
the fact that people are overburdened with social responsibility. The rise of consumerism in the
latter half of the post WWII era paired with the subsequent dismantling of voluntarism led to the
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fall of strong civil society groups that in the past pioneered social welfare movements. Organized
voluntary groups once carried the weight of social responsibility to implement public policies.
Today, as Marshall would argue, Americans maintain their civic and political duties. However,
in addition to these duties, they are also tasked with the responsibility of maintaining various
individual social welfare necessities that were once the collective responsibility of voluntary
associations. Furthermore, Marshall would reason that the stress of maintaining individual social
status required for membership in the American republic leaves no room or opportunity for
people to develop thick citizenship. Marshall would propose that, in order to revitalize the thin
American citizenry and grow civil society, citizens must be freed from the obligation of
maintaining the social status required for membership in the thick citizenry.

Repairing the Madisonian Contract
Marshall’s remedy to fix the contemporary American republic originates under his
presupposition that citizenship in the United States is premised on the same conditions of classconsciousness as found in Europe. Inherent in Marshall’s solution is the notion that in order to
develop thick citizenship in America citizens must overcome oppression through a social
revolution to escape membership inequality. However, as Louis Hartz (1991) reasons, “America
was settled by men who fled the feudal oppression of the old world” and therefore, feudalism
“did not flower” in the American republic as it did in Europe (Hartz, 7). Feudalism was entirely
absent in the history of American political development, in its place was the liberal spirit
supplemented with “social fluidity, fortified by the material setting of the new word” (Hartz, 18).
It is because American citizens “were born equal,” as Alexis de Tocqueville (1991) noted, that
they were already afforded class equality in society and did not need to “endure a revolution in
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order to become [equal]” as they would have under a feudal structure (Hartz, 5). In America, thin
citizenship is a characteristic not exclusively pertaining to members of “a frustrated lower class,”
thin citizenship is also a characteristic of a “frustrated aristocracy” (Hartz, 8). That is to say,
many Americans practice thin citizenship across all social classes regardless of a citizen’s degree
of social welfare responsibility. Thin citizenship has become a norm across American society.
Therefore, developing thick citizenship and growing civil society will not be accomplished by
relieving people of their social responsibilities.
The thin engagement of the American citizenry is largely due the fact that American
political life does not demand today what theory required in the past, deliberative citizenship. As
Michael Carpini and Scott Keeter (1996) reason, citizens are under the impression that “the
political system can operate effectively without a great deal of public input” (Carpini, Keeter, 4).
Furthermore, there are “thin expectations of civil responsibility” despite Madison assuming thick
engagement (Carpini, Keeter, 4). In order to develop thick citizens and grow a strong civil
society, the American republic needs engaged catalysts, the remaining individuals who constitute
Citizenry II and Citizenry III in society, to facilitate deliberative citizenship.
The remaining thick citizenry, those who retain a commitment to the Madisonian
contract, are those suited to be effective opinion leaders and must rewrite the terms of the
Madisonian contract. These leaders are tasked with the duty to make the formal demands of the
thin American citizenry that political life today does not. The thick citizenry must lead by
example and demand that Citizenry I develops an intellectual capacity to “engage in politics that
is personally and collectively constructive,” while also motivating political participation
(Carpini, Keeter, 5). These opinion leaders ought to educate their peers and facilitate a new
public arena that acts as an incubator of thick citizenship through “the cultivation of civil
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intellect” and the exchange of informed opinion (Mill, 5). In order to mend one side of the
broken Madisonian contract, a thick citizenry must be reestablished in the American republic.
Given that the American citizenship model is rooted in public interest, it is essential that
emerging opinion leaders are the very same engaged catalysts that defend the public interest.
These citizens will embody the new mechanism of social change and will establish an evolved
civil society “that can work hand in hand [with the government] to fashion and sustain” a new
Madisonian contract (Ricci, 71).
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